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tain person, anybody familiar with that person's handwriting may testify, although he pretends to no skill in the matter. *State v. Shinborn*, 46 N. H. 497, 88 Am. Dec. 224. So also, where one has considerable familiarity with the signature or handwriting of a person growing out of numerous observations, he may give his opinion even though unable to read or write. *Foye v. Patch*, 132 Mass. 105, 108. Where undoubted standards of handwriting, as well as the questioned signature, are before the jury, there is no occasion for the testimony of one who is neither an expert nor possessed of considerable familiarity with the handwriting of the person whose signature is under examination. The opinion of the jury under such circumstances is quite as good as that of the witness of ordinary experience who has no particular acquaintance with the genuine handwriting. There is, under such circumstances, no occasion for the opinion of the outsider of only ordinary intelligence. *Whalen v. Rosnosky*, 195 Mass. 545, 81 N. E. 282, 122 Am. St. Rep. 271; *Commonwealth v. Tucker*, 189 Mass. 457, 486, 76 N. E. 127, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1056."

Automobiles—Relative Rights of Driver of Automobile and Pedestrian—*Aiken v. Metcalf*, 97 Atl. 669.—In the principal case the court said that a pedestrian and the driver of an automobile have equal and reciprocal rights in the highway, and each is bound to make use of his own right so as not to interfere with that of the other. A driver of an automobile, which on account of its speed, weight and quietness of locomotion can do great damage, is under duty to exercise a greater and more constant caution in the use of the highway than is a pedestrian, being required to exercise care commensurate with the dangers arising from a lack of it. A pedestrian crossing the highway is also bound to exercise care in avoiding dangers, as from an approaching automobile, commensurate with the danger arising from lack of care that a prudent man would exercise under the same circumstances—a measure of duty varying with the circumstances.

It was further held that the rule, applicable to one approaching a railroad crossing, does not apply to a pedestrian crossing a highway, relative to his duty to look out for an automobile; the look and listen rule and the constant vigilance rule not applying to a pedestrian using the public highway. A foot passenger crossing a highway has a right to assume, nothing appearing to the contrary, that the driver of an approaching automobile will obey the law and not drive in a careless or negligent manner, will observe the usual road rules, and not take the left side of the road.

Negligence—Liability of Manufacturer—*Kerwin v. Chippewa Shoe Mfg. Co.*, 157 N. W. 1101.—In the principal case it was held that a manufacturer of shoes who uses nails in the soles in such a manner